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NEW ISSUES RAISED BY RESPONDENTS BRIEF
In addressing the new issues raised by Respondents Brief, Petitioner/Appellant,
Sandra Sheikh will be referred to as "Petitioner" and Respondent/Appellee, State of
Utah/Utah Department of Public Safety will be referred to as "Respondent".
The new issues raised by the Respondent Brief in responds to Petitioner's Brief
are: (1) Did Petitioner address the ALJ decision that she had failed to meet a prima
facie case; and (2) whether Petitioner met her burden to marshal favorable evidence
supporting the ALf's decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER DID ADDRESS THE ALTS
DETERMINATION THAT SHE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASK
Respondent claims Petitioner did not address the prima facie issues. Respondent
cites Love vs. ReMax of AM.. 738 F.2d 383 (10th Qr. 1984) for the proposition that to
establish a prima facie case on employment discrimination the charging party must show
that she (1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) was subjected by the employer to adverse
employment action and (3) a causal link between the two.
Petitioner did in fact address the three prongs of the test in her Brief.
On pages 17 and 19 of Petitioner's Brief, Petitioner discussed the standard for
finding a "discriminatory intent". Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah. Inc.. 639 E2d 1199
1

(D. Utah 1986) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) both
stand for the proposition that no one is likely to admit to such discriminatory intent and
circumstantial evidence and indirect evidence must be considered. Petitioner's Brief is
replete with examples of circumstantial and indirect evidence. The case of Nulf v.
International Paper Company, 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1981) stands for the proposition
that if pregnancy or pregnancy-related matters are followed by disparate treatment
and/or termination of employment, there is an inference that there was a discriminatory
motive, ij^, a causal link between the pregnancy and disparate treatment. That
discriminatory motive can be rebutted by a very dissatisfactory explanation for the
conduct of which is complained.
There was never any dispute between the parties that Petitioner took a leave for
pregnancy and upon return was given a schedule which was an unusually onerous. It was
established and unrebutted during the course of the administrative hearing that no one
in the two years following consolidation had been given a pre-planned schedule or
worked a schedule like the one Petitioner had been given on her return from maternity
leave and no one after that was given such a schedule even though there were rotating
schedules, absences, leaves, illnesses and other problems. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact
Statement Nos. 9, 12, 22, 23, 24, 30, 42, 44, 49). Ergo, disparate treatment.
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Petitioner, in her Brief, also cited and discussed the application of Garner v. WalMart Stores. Inc.. 807 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1987) wherein a prima facie case of
discrimination was established. The Plaintiff returned after maternity leave to find she
was placed as a "floater" between departments instead of in her former position as
manager. She quit the first day back. The Court determined that the employer should
try to ameliorate the situation and give assurance of a change but she left before the
employer had a chance; thus, it was not "constructive discharge". Petitioner's Brief
demonstrates that Respondent had, at a minimum, 2 weeks after learning of her
dissatisfaction with the schedule to give assurances and ameliorate the schedule but did
nothing. (See Petitioner's Fact Statement No. 29; see Respondent's Brief, p. 37, citing
R. 630, 668).
Thus, Petitioner did in fact address the issues of discriminatory intent and
constructive discharge and disparate treatment throughout her entire Brief. It appears
that Respondent's primary complaint is one of form over substance, that is, that
Petitioner did not choose to segregate that issue from the remainder of the Brief by
assigning it as a separate point heading. The issue was so integral to the entire case that
it was discussed throughout Petitioner's entire Brief.
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POINT II
PETITIONER DID MEET THE BURDEN OF
MARSHALLING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE ALJ FINDINGS AND OF PRESENTING
A FATAL FLAW IN THE EVIDENCE,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1954, as amended) provides that the
Appellate Court can grant relief if the person seeking review has been substantially
prejudiced by agency action based upon a determination of fact that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. The
meaning of the term that "the record was not supported by substantial evidence" has
been explained and defined by this Cburt on a number of occasions. In Nelson v.
Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated that
"A party challenging the factual findings of the Board must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence." (quoting Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68) 801 P.2d 158 at 161. In Mountain
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989) this Court stated that.
. . "a party" must marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous'" (citations
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omitted). In West Valley Qty v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) the
Court stated:
. . . the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, ever scrap of confident evidence introduced
at the trial which supports the very findings the appellate
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence.
818 P.2d 1311 at 1315.
In the instant case, this was a particularly difficult standard to interpret and apply
because the position of Petitioner is not so much that the evidence presented cannot be
relied upon, rather, Petitioner's position is that the A U did not apply the proper
standard of law on either the discrimination issue or the constructive discharge issue.
Discrimination: Petitioner readily acknowledged in her Brief that, based on the
evidence presented at the Hearing, Respondent had articulated seemingly legitimate
reasons for the schedule given to Petitioner upon her return from maternity leave. The
AU, however, failed to make any determination as to whether Petitioner had
successfully rebutted those "legitimate reasons". As set forth in Petitioner's Brief, there
was never any evidence presented to the ALJ to explain that despite those reasons and
despite the written policy (which explained erratic shifts, short notice, baby-sitting
problems and other difficulties with the job, and which Petitioner had signed), that no
one in two years since the consolidation or subsequent to the consolidation had ever

5

been given a schedule as onerous as was Petitioner's. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact
Statement No. 22) Also, during the approximate three weeks while Russell was training
prior to Petitioner's return to work, no one was given the schedule which Petitioner was
given upon her return, and following Petitioner's termination, for approximately one
week Russell was still training and no one was given Petitioner's schedule. (See Brief,
Fact Statement No. 22)
Thus, the difficulty in "marshalling evidence" supporting the ALJ finding was that
there was no finding and no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate a response to
Petitioner's rebuttal of the "legitimate reasons". Rather, the ALJ decision simply stated
that the Respondent had articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule. It was that
finding with which Petitioner took issue and there was no evidence to marshall as to a
response to Petitioner's rebuttal. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact Statement No. 22)
Nevertheless, in an attempt to comply with the standards concerning the
marshalling of evidence, Petitioner did in her Brief summarize, point by point, all of the
evidence presented by Respondent at the Hearing which demonstrated a legitimate
reason for the schedule. A comparison between Point II of Respondent's Brief and
Point II of Petitioner's Brief will confirm that every piece of evidence supporting the
"legitimate reasons" recited by Respondent were addressed by Petitioner's Brief, although
in a summarized form.

6

Petitioner did meet her burden under the law. She did correlate the evidence
with the challenged findings by acknowledging and summarizing the evidence presented
by Respondent at the Hearing in regard to each of the challenged ALT findings;
Petitioner then presented to this Court the evidence that demonstrates the pretext of
those "articulated legitimate reasons". That is, Petitioner presented an uncontradicted
rebuttal of all of the evidence concerning legitimate reasons for the action by
Respondent.1 See West Valley City, supra at 1315.
Petitioner has met her burden of showing the "fatal flaw" in the evidence
presented by Respondent as to its "legitimate reasons".
Constructive Discharge: Once again, it is really more a question of whether the
judge correctly applied the law and of the total lack of evidence to support certain
requirements under the law. Also, once again, Petitioner's Brief concerning constructive
discharge specifically designates the findings of the ALJ of which she complains and

Respondent did, in its Response Brief, for the very first time, raise an argument,
although no evidence to support it, that the explanation as to why no one had ever been
given such a schedule was that this was a unique situation that had never existed before
or after. Respondent argues that the schedule had only been in existence for a few
weeks and unique circumstances necessitated changes. Respondent gives no citation to
any evidence which supports that this situation was unique any more than any situation,
that is, every day was different, as acknowledged by Respondent and Petitioner, in that a
schedule might have to be changed at any time due to absence, vacation, illness, etc.
There was no evidence presented whatsoever at the Hearing to support that this situation
was any more unique or difficult than many situations over the course of years. This is
the first attempt to explain the disparate treatment and should not be considered by this
Cburt at this late date.
7

Petitioner did acknowledge, in summary form, the evidence presented by Respondent
concerning those findings.
The standard for constructive discharge is whether or not a reasonable person
would have found the situation intolerable. The employer has some obligation to give
assurances that the situation would not continue and attempt to ameliorate the situation
and the employee has some obligation to give the employer a reasonable opportunity to
ameliorate or change the situation Garner, supra.
In this case, as acknowledged by Petitioner's Brief, Respondent presented
evidence on a number of the constructive discharge issues. Petitioner acknowledged all
of the evidence, in summarized fashion, that is set forth in Respondent's Brief
concerning constructive discharge. The critical point, the "fatal flaw", however, is that no
evidence whatsoever was presented that would answer the question as to why no
assurances were given to Petitioner and no attempt to ameliorate the situation was taken
after Petitioner gave her notice on May 10th, Le^ after Respondent knew for a certainty
that Petitioner found the schedule intolerable. There is no evidence to marshall as to
any effort to give assurances or ameliorate after May 10th, despite the fact that
Petitioner gave two weeks notice. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact Statements Nos. 29, 34,
53). Thus, once again, the AU and the Respondent fell short of meeting the entire legal
standard concerning constructive discharge by failing to address the obligation to give
assurances.
8

ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLICATION OF OPINION
Oral argument is requested in this case because Petitioner believes that the
decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. The reason for this
belief is that the primary issues in the case revolve around a complex, intricate and
detailed scheduling process. The scheduling process was explained and discussed at great
length at the Hearing which was approximately twelve hours in length. A brief
explanation by counsel of the basic scheduling process and the pertinent factors involved
would be helpful to the Court and save the Court considerable time in trying to
understand the scheduling process and the documentation of a two year period of
schedules.
Petitioner does not believe a published opinion in this matter is necessary and
does not request one.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner did address the issue of whether or not a prima facie case had been
made.
Petitioner did meet the burden of showing lack of substantial evidence. To
marshall all of Respondent's evidence concerning "legitimate reasons" for the schedule
and its failure to change or revise it after May 10th would not only be arduous but totally
unnecessary. Petitioner acknowledged in her Brief that Respondent had put forth many
seemingly legitimate explanations on its reasons for the schedule and its reasons for not
9

changing the schedule; however, both Respondent and the ALJ totally failed to address
the critical issue under the law on discrimination and constructive discharge. Regarding
discrimination, Respondent failed to present any evidence whatsoever as to why no one
had ever been given such a pre-planned schedule. Regarding constructive discharge,
Respondent failed to present any evidence as to why no one gave any assurances or
made any attempts to ameliorate between May 10 (the date of Petitioner's resignation)
and May 24 (Petitioner's last day at work). In other words, on the two "fatal flaws" there
was no evidence to marshall. Nevertheless, Petitioner's Brief did, summarize the
evidence of Respondent on every issue that is set forth in Respondent's Brief which
Respondent claims support its case.
Respondent requests that this Court sustain the Industrial Commission, on the
grounds that Commissioner did not address the prima facie issue and did not correctly
"marshall" the evidence favorable to Respondent; however, Respondent failed completely
to address Point I of Petitioner's Brief, the ALJ's erroneous application of the law. The
ALJ's erroneous application f the law was and still is a basis in and off itself for this
Court to reverse the Commission, and this Court should do so.
This Court should remand the matter to the Industrial Commission of Utah with
directions to issue an Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Review, ordering
Petitioner's reinstatement, to make findings and conclusions on the amount of money
owed to her, that is determining the pay due her from the date of her constructive
10

discharge on May 24, 1990 plus interest at 10% per annum, and to obtain affidavits of
costs and attorneys fees from Petitioner's counsel, calculate that amount into the total
judgment in favor of Petitioner and enter judgment in favor of Petitioner against
Respondent accordingly.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J0**1 day of June, 1995.

Suzianne West
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ther^^xiay of June, 1995,1 caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid in the United States mail, a copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Reply to
Brief of Respondent, to the following:
Stephen G. Schwendiman
Utah Attorney General's Office
4120 State Office Building
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0811
Sharon J. Eblen
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
Industrial Cbmmission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-660Q
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